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INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS FOR
LIVING MATTER: BIOTECHNOLOGY, MULTINATIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND THE EXCEPTION FOR AGRICULTURE
David G. Scalise*
Daniel Nugen*
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries human beings have selectively bred plants and
animals to achieve superior agricultural products. This work has been
painstakingly accomplished through cross fertilization and progressive
plant and animal selection with the hope that the desired characteristic of
the selected parent will surface in its offspring. Traditional methods repre-
sent a slow and arduous process whose results sometimes lack exactitude
and require constant oversight to maintain stability.'
The biotechnological revolution of the 1980s and 1990s has enabled
scientists to isolate the genetic material of living organisms and induce
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' Also, after the desired characteristics were achieved, there existed an inherent ten-
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precise modifications so organisms portray and carry desired genetic traits.
This ability is expected to revolutionize agriculture by developing geneti-
cally superior plants and animals. Biotechnologists are already developing
plants that will be less reliant on toxic pesticides and fertilizers and
capable of surviving on less water, and will likely possess higher nutri-
tional values, improved taste and better appearance.2 Animal-related
research has already achieved more productive dairy cows and anticipates
livestock that will provide higher yields of more nutritional meat that is
lower in fat and cholesterol.3 When one considers that total agribusiness
revenues in the U.S. alone topped $1 trillion in 1992, one can begin to
conceive of the immense financial opportunities in the agricultural-bio-
technology industry (ag-biotech).4
History bears out that heedless progress inevitably destroys something
of value. The most daunting illustration of this tradeoff is the splitting of
the atom, which yielded humanity an almost inexhaustible supply of rela-
tively clean-burning fuel while giving us the power to atomize ourselves.5
Manipulation of the gene is not immune from the potential for such
tramplings. The hypothetical "parade of horribles" articulated by those
opposed to genetic research expresses fears of cloning people, engineering
super-humans, releasing pathogenic microbes and numerous other
misapplications of science.6
More tangible concerns regarding the biotechnological revolution will
be realized within the agricultural community, both within the U.S. and
internationally. The combination of biotechnology and corporate farming
will achieve productivity and economies of scale that will make less
efficient family and subsistence farmers unable to compete. Consequently,
2 VICE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPEITFIVENESS, REPORT ON NATIONAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, at 3 (Feb. 19, 1991). Among the scores of foods to be
expected are cross-species products such as juice made from tomatoes spliced with an
Arctic-flounder gene to inhibit frost, and potatoes carrying a chicken gene to improve
disease resistance. Tim Sandler, Brave New Foods; Some Consumer Land Mines Await
Biotech Products, PACIFIC SUN, Oct. 13-19, 1993, at 12.
3 Al Gore, Federal Biotechnology Policy: The Perils of Progress and the Risks of
Uncertainty, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 965, 969 (1987). The introduction of bovine growth
hormones has already resulted in cows that can produce 40% more milk. The article
also discusses efforts underway to achieve multiple and more rapid birth rates, and
animals with a higher resistance to disease. See also Edmund J. Sease, From Microbes,
To Corn Seeds, To Oysters, To Mice: Patentability of New Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L.
REv. 551, 566 (1989).
4 Joan C. Hamilton et al., The Country Cousin Is Blossoming, Too, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 2, 1992, at 72.
5 Gore, supra note 3, at 967.
6 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
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there are domestic concerns that ag-biotech applications will jeopardize
the future of the small family farmer, and international opinion is con-
cerned about the further depredation of developing nations.7
To combat this danger, many implore the inclusion into intellectual
property law a special right for farmers (farmers' privilege) to make use
of agriculturally related patent and breeders' rights.8 But such an addition
amounts to a compulsory license, free from obligations to compensate
inventors and immune from intellectual property infringement. Most of the
world's jurisdictions yield some form of farmers' privilege exemption
ranging from a limited right to replant and breed protected plants and
animals to an outright refusal to recognize inventors' rights in living mat-
ter.9 In carving out such special exemptions, individual nations and
international bodies must remain conscious of the incentive -- money, that
drives industry to achieve new and beneficial discoveries in the bio-
sciences.
This article examines international intellectual property rights for the
protection of living matter. It analyzes multinational convention efforts,
the recurring issue of farmers' privilege and their impact upon the
biotechnology industry. Section II discusses intellectual property laws in
the U.S. and provides a framework and understanding from which to
analyze the issues presented by farmers' privilege. It begins by addressing
the rationale for vesting inventors with the right to exclude others from
using their inventions, and the forms of intellectual property protections
available to inventors of new or modified living organisms under U.S.
law. Next, it focuses on the legislative exemptions for farmers' privilege
recognized within the U.S. Finally, it explores the issue of whether
intellectual property laws are an appropriate forum within which to create
such an exemption.
" Gore, supra note 3, at 970. "The yield on a large farm in Iowa is forty times
that of a subsistence farm in Nigeria . .." Id.
' "Farmers' privilege" is used as a generic term that includes all forms of special
use rights granted to farmers within all jurisdictions of the world. See David G. Scalise
& Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the European Community: Diriment of the
Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 990, 1030 (1993).
' See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988) for a
discussion of this legislation. The self-reproducing nature of animals introduces some
ambiguities even into U.S. law. Although the intentional breeding of protected animals
clearly infringes upon the owner's intellectual property rights, incidental mating in
normal pen or cage conditions between protected animals can hardly be controlled. This
led one commentator to conclude that incidental breeding would not support an
infringement suit if the event lacked a culpable mental state. Merges, supra note 1, at
1068-69.
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Section Im provides an international perspective of farmers' privilege.
It also discusses international treaties and conventions addressing interna-
tional intellectual property rights and the failure to resolve the conflict
between the interests of private industry in industrialized countries and the
needs of developing countries.
The conclusion addresses alternatives for achieving an international
sharing of technology while avoiding the deleterious effects upon the
biotechnology industry of globally recognized farmers' privilege.
I. UNITED STATES LAW ADDRESSING BIOTECHNOLOGY AND FARMERS'
PRIVILEGE
The concept of farmers' privilege with respect to intellectual property
rights is analogous to an easement in real property. An easement entitles
its holder to the limited use and enjoyment of another's land free from
obligation to compensate the landowner and immune from prosecution for
such use. Similarly, farmers' privilege allows farmers to use inventors'
intellectual property for the limited purposes of breeding or replanting
free from obligation to pay subsequent licensing fees. It also insulates
farmers from prosecution for infringement.
The nature of farmers' privilege removes from inventors' rights a
certain dimension of ownership in their intellectual property. Therefore, to
fully comprehend the impact of such an exemption, we must become
familiar with the basics of recognizing exclusive rights for inventors.
Then we may begin to analyze the implications of curtailing those rights
through special exemptions.
A. Exclusive Rights to Invention
Two generally accepted rationales support recognition of exclusive
rights to invention. Exclusive rights create the incentive to invent and
facilitate the dissemination of useful information. The first element,
creating the incentive to invent, is fostered by states that grant innovators
of new and useful products or processes the right to exclude others from
using the new technologies.'0 Affording innovators this right enables
"0 Thomas M. Keane, The Patentability of Biotechnological Inventions, IR. LAW
TIMEs 139 (1992).
At first, "the right to exclude others from using" may seem phrased unnecessarily
in the negative. However, contrary to popular perception, a patent does not create the
inherent right to use the patented invention, only the "right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). To illustrate, inventor
B receives a patent for technology that incorporates prior technology subject to the
patent of inventor A. B cannot use B's technology without a license from A, i.e., no
[Vol. 27:083
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them to recover the research and development costs of producing new
technologies and to obtain reasonable profits, which reward innovative
thought and stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit. Absent such legal
protections, others could duplicate end products and, by eliminating the
research and development costs incurred by original developers, undercut
their prices. In an environment without inventors' rights, investors would
be unwilling to commit capital resources to develop new ideas, knowing
there was scant opportunity to realize a reasonable return on their invest-
ments. And without adequate capital investment, progress would stagnate.
Facilitating the dissemination of useful information is the second
element. Absent adequate legal protections, inventors would be likely to
shroud their new ideas in secrecy while they attempt to realize the
commercial value." This secrecy would result in inefficient, duplicative
research and a reluctance to share ideas, which so often lead to further
developments and new applications. Although current patent laws protect
inventors' rights, they require full disclosure of patented products or
processes. Patented information becomes freely available to the public and
enters the public domain when the patent expires.' In the meantime,
other inventors may use information from prior patents to develop deriva-
tive inventions, although they must pay royalties to the patent holders.
"The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to
put an end to research or to its attendant risks," but the rate of progress
in an environment without intellectual property rights certainly will not
approach the rate with protections. 3 This is particularly true for capital-
intensive industries like biotechnology, in which long-term cash commit-
ments are necessary to finance protracted research and development
cycles. As an illustration, it is estimated that one ag-biotech concern
committed more than $900,000 over several years to develop a more
durable and productive maize hybrid, and another approximately $600,000
for a soybean variety with similar characteristics. 4 Without adequate
right to use. B can, however, prevent anyone from making use of B's patented
technology - hence the right to exclude.
See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have the power...
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
Id.
" Keane, supra note 10, at 139.
,2 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988). The Act requires the inventor to provide a complete
description of the new invention, indicating how it works and the best means by which
to reproduce it. Id.
13 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
" Robin Waite & Nigel Jones, Biotechnological Patents in Europe - The Draft
1995]
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legal protections it is improbable that private industry would commit such
resources to develop the new technologies that will ultimately benefit all
society.
B. Intellectual Property Rights for New Agricultural Technologies
Prior to 1970 the only intellectual property rights available to protect
new inventions pertaining to living matter were contained in the Plant
Patent Act of 1930 (PPA), 5 which recognized exclusive rights in a
restricted class of asexual or vegetative reproducing plant life. 6 In 1970
Congress enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 which
extended protections for development of new varieties of sexually repro-
duced plants and expanded coverage to the most valuable commercial
agricultural crops. 8 The PVPA became much more valuable for commer-
cial agriculture because the bulk of commercial crops are sexually re-
produced, thus the exclusive domain of the PVPA.
The concept of farmers' privilege was introduced into U.S. law
within the PVPA. It authorized qualifying farmers to sell and replant seed
varieties protected under the PVPA free from obligation to pay royalties
to the PVPA certificate holder.
Prior to the PVPA there was no need for a special farmers' exemp-
tion, because before 1970 there was no form of property rights that
would protect sexually reproducing plant life. Rights under U.S. patent
laws were withheld from subject matter involving living organisms under
the judicially conceived principle known as the products of nature doc-
trine (see following sections). Consequently, plant breeders could protect
their discoveries only through qualification under the PPA or PVPA.
This area of intellectual property law was dramatically altered by the
Directive, 11 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 145, 146 (1989).
's Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) [hereinafter Plant Patent Act].
36 Asexual reproduction encompasses all forms of vegetative propagation, including
grafting, budding, air layering and reproduction through the use of tissue cultures. See
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 476 (1971); Otto E. Landman,
Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics Revisited, 43 BIOSCIENCE 696 (1993); Howard
M. Lenhoff & Sylvia G. Lenhoff, Trembly's Polyps, 258 Sci. AM. 108 (1988).
"7 See Plant Variety Protection Act (1970), Pub. L. No. 91-577, reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5082, 5083 [hereinafter Plant Variety Protection Act].
18 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2401-03, 2543 (1988). The PVPA
expressly excluded from plant variety protection fungi and bacteria. 7 U.S.C. § 2402
(1988).
Sexual reproduction involves the use of seed. Seed is the ripened ovule of a plant
that is created when pollen is transferred from the stamen (the male organ of the
flower) to the ovule (the female organ of the flower).
[Vol. 27:083
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landmark Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chakrabarty.9 Delivered by
the Supreme Court in 1980, the Diamond decision purported to overturn
the products of nature doctrine and to recognize plant life as protectable
subject matter under a standard utility patent. The following discusses
these developments in detail.
1. The Standard Utility Patent
U.S. patent law dates back more than two hundred years to the
passage of the first patent act in 1790. Thomas Jefferson, instrumental in
enacting that legislation, is also credited as the architect of Article I,
section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress to
make laws that "promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."'2 The framers of the Constitu-
tion understood the need to encourage inventors to invest in new technol-
ogies by offering temporary protections against those who would infringe.
Although the patent laws were amended several times, the most
recent version, the Patent Act of 1952, preserves the three tenets that
have governed since the inception of patent protection: novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness of the invention. Title 35, codifying the Patent Act
of 1952, states, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title (emphasis added)."' The term
"new" is enlarged in §§ 102 and 103, which combine to deny patents
when the invention is "known or used by others" (novelty) or is a mere
extension of knowledge obvious to a person learned in the art
(nonobviousness).'
The language that follows the "new" and "useful" elements in § 101
defines the scope of patentable subject matter to encompass any "process,
machine, or composition of matter... " Subsequent judicial doctrine has
narrowed this scope by identifying several classes of nonpatentable
inventions to exclude scientific principles, laws of nature, physical phe-
nomena, abstract ideas and products of nature.' The exclusion of prod-
'9 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
" Id. at §§ 102-103.
Elizabeth Joy Hetch, Note: Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The
Controversy Over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1030
(1992).
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ucts of nature from patentable subject matter is at the core of this paper.
2. The Products of Nature Doctrine
The products of nature doctrine is derived from the inherent truth
that something cannot be new if it already exists in nature. 4 Discovery
of a previously unknown plant variety or animal species is certainly new
by dictionary definition; however, to be patentable, the applicant must
take an inventive step. To illustrate this requirement, suppose a scientist
discovers a previously unknown plant in the South American rain forest
that, in its natural form, counteracts Alzheimer's disease. Although the
discovery is unquestionably valuable, it lacks the necessary inventive step
for patentability. To satisfy the novelty requirement, the scientist must
contribute something to the plant that alters its natural qualities and
renders something new.
Although the products of nature doctrine appears to be rather
straightforward, the courts have a history of manipulating its application
to reject the patentability of higher life forms. Their decisions precariously
defined the degree of intervention, - that inventive step - that trans-
forms the subject matter from a product of nature into a patentable
organism." The Court's quandary and ambiguity are well-illustrated by
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex.26
In this case, Brogdex won a patent infringement action against
American Fruit Growers (AFG), alleging that AFG made unlawful use of
Brogdex's patented process of impregnating orange rinds with small
amounts of borax, thereby rendering the fruit resistant to destructive blue
mold decay. AFG appealed the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that
Brogdex's patent defined nothing more than a natural fruit and therefore
was an unpatentable product of nature. Brogdex, relying upon the circuit
court's rationale, asserted that borax did not naturally collect in orange
rinds and therefore was not a "composition of matter" found in nature.
The Supreme Court rejected Brogdex's claims and reversed the
district court and court of appeals, asserting that the "addition of Borax
to the rind of natural fruit does not produce . . . an article for use which
possesses a new or distinctive form, quality or property." The Court
concluded, "there is no change in the name, appearance, or general
character of the fruit."'27 The Court's analysis seemed indefensible, and
2 Sease, supra note 3, at 554.
2 Id.
' American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
27 Id. at 11. The Supreme Court quoted a portion of the circuit court's opinion:
"[t]he product is a combination of the natural fruit and a boric compound carried by
[Vol. 27:083
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many have commented that "there was little logic in the decision."' The
borax-impregnated orange undeniably possessed a new and distinct quality
in that it was resistant to the ruinous blue mold decay, a quality that
changes the general character of the fruit.
The products of nature doctrine was applied with equal bafflement to
reject patent applications covering advancements in animal husbandry.29
As exemplified in American Fruit Growers, the courts appeared willing
to transcend the boundaries of logic to repudiate the patentability of a
complex living organism. As a consequence, plant breeders were reduced
to the illusory rights available under the PPA while animal breeders were
denied any substantive rights for their developments.
3. The Plant Patent Act of 1930
In addition to the obstacle represented by the products of nature
doctrine, plant breeders seeking patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
were confronted with an exacting written description requirement. Prior to
the birth of biotechnology, plant breeding was an indeterminate science
whose developments were more easily observed than explained. When a
new plant differed from the old only in color, scent or texture, it was
almost impossible to satisfy the written description requirement. Conse-
quently, plant breeders were denied substantive protection for their
discoveries, derailing innovation in this field.30
Recognizing the inadequacies of the patent laws, Congress enacted
the PPA in 1930 to "afford agriculture, so far as practicable, the same
opportunity to participate in the benefits of the patent system as has been
given industry."'" The PPA states, "[a]ny person who has invented or
the rind or skin in an amount sufficient to render the fruit resistant to decay. The
complete article is not found in nature and is thus an article of manufacture." d
Sease, supra note 3, at 555.
2 For an illustration see Ex parte Grayson, 51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413 (PTO Bd. App.
1941), in which the court rejected a patent claim covering a fresh shrimp from which
the head and sand vein had been removed. Despite the increased commercial value of
this improved shrimp, the court determined that the resulting product was still a natural
shrimp and therefore precluded from patent protections under the products of nature
doctrine.
o "Prior to the Plant Patent Act of 1930, there was very little private plant
breeding done aside from that performed by a handful of amateurs or hobbyists. Since
then [1930], and today [1970], some 2,700 plant patents have been issued, largely to
commercial breeders." Plant Variety Protection Act, supra note 17, at 5083.
"' Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Departmental Operations of the Committee
on Agriculture, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970) (statement of Allenby White, Chairman,
Breeders' Rights Study Committee, American Seed Trade Association, quoting S. REP.
1995]
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discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of
plant . . . may obtain a [plant] patent ... (emphasis added)."32 Further-
more, to address the issue of written description, the PPA proclaims, "No
plant patent shall be declared invalid for non-compliance with section 112
of this title if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible. ' 3
Under the PPA, the elements of invents or discovers, distinct and
new, are loosely analogous to the elements of novelty, utility and
nonobviousness required for a standard utility patent. A distinct plant
variety will possess at least one significantly different characteristic that
may be physiological (e.g., immunity to disease, resistance to cold) or
anatomical (e.g., size, shape or color) and need appear only in some
portion of the plant (root, stem, leaf or fruit). "Newness" and "invents or
discovers" simply require that the plant possess a heretofore unappreciated
characteristic and that the breeder possess the foresight to asexually repro-
duce the plant.' The requirements for obtaining a plant patent, therefore,
are substantially more liberal than those mandated for a standard utility
patent.
The PPA was not an unqualified victory for plant breeders. By the
terms of the statute, plant patents are available only for asexually repro-
ducing plants with the express exclusion of "tuber propagated plants" and
"plants found in an uncultivated state."35 Subsequent judicial interpreta-
tion further removed newly discovered bacteria36 and tissue cultures used
to create a plant variety37 because they were each found not to be plants
within the meaning of the PPA. Moreover, because the PPA protects only
asexually reproducing plants, the patentee may exclude others only from
asexual reproduction of the plant or from the use or sale of the protected
plant that was asexually reproduced. The net result of this legislation
was a mechanism that offered narrow protections for plant breeders and
awakened a measurable amount of research activity in this area. However,
the narrow scope of the PPA neglected those plant species that comprise
the bulk of U.S. commercial agriculture, rendering the legislation largely
No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930)) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Departmental Operations].
32 Plant Patent Act, supra note 15.
3 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988). See also Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Departmental Operations, supra note 31, at 7.
3 PETER D. ROSENBERG, 1 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.01[4][a] (2d ed. Supp.
1994).
" See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988).
36 See In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
3' Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (P.T.O Rd. App. & Int. 1985).
38 See 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
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unavailing to breeders engaging in the most beneficial research.39
4. The Plant Varieties Protection Act of 1970
The PPA was a qualified boon to the science of plant breeding, as
evidenced by the 2,700 plant patents issued between its enactment, in
1930, and 1970. Its success was qualified, however, because the PPA
excluded major U.S. cash crops such as cotton, wheat, barley, soybeans,
oats and rice, which could not be vegetatively propagated. Researchers in
private industry consequently subordinated those crops. By 1964, Western
Europe had enacted laws to invigorate its plant breeding industry4 and
was fully appreciating the benefits of recognizing inventors' rights in
sexually reproducing new plant varieties." This progress placed U.S.
agriculture at a competitive disadvantage because U.S. farmers lacked im-
proved seed varieties being developed and protected by Western European
nations. In response to this inauspicious trend, Congress passed the PVPA
in 1970.
(a) Certification of a Plant Variety
The PVPA established a mechanism whereby "the breeder of any
novel variety of sexually reproducing plants (except fungi, bacteria, and
hybrids) ... is entitled to plant variety protections,"'42 wherein a sexual-
ly reproducing plant is identified as any plant reproduced by seed (em-
phasis added).43 Like the PPA, the PVPA contains the liberal written
description requirement: the applicant need only specify that the claim is
"as complete as is reasonably possible."'
The required showing to obtain a certificate covering a novel plant
3 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Departmental Operations, supra note 31.
o See, e.g., Convention for the Establishment of the European and Mediterranean
Plant Protection Organisation, Apr. 18, 1951, U.K.T.S. 44; International Convention for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter
the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties]; Plant Varieties and
Seeds Act of 1964 (U.K.).
41 See Plant Variety Protection Act, supra note 17, at 5083. In 1964, England
enacted its Plant Varieties and Seeds Act to come into compliance with the Western
European plant breeders rights convention.
47 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988).
41 Id. at § 2401(0.
' Id. at § 2422(2). The uncertainty of nongenetic-based inventions in the science
of plant breeding denied plant breeders access to utility patents, because the disclosure
requirements of a utility patent could not be achieved with the necessary specificity.
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
1995]
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variety is laid out in title 7 U.S.C. § 2401. Subsection (a) defines a
"novel variety as one [1] differing in any characteristic from all prior
varieties, [2] possessing uniformity to the extent that any variations are
predictable and commercially acceptable, and having reasonable stability
(emphasis added)." The distinctiveness and newness elements contained in
the PPA are preserved in the PVPA by this definition, which requires that
a patentable plant "differs in any characteristic from all prior varieties."
The second element, pertaining to "uniformity," supplants the "in-
vents or discovers" element within the PPA, which requires that the
breeder asexually reproduce the new variety. The offspring of an asexual-
ly reproduced plant contains the identical genetic material as its sole
parent; hence the resultant offspring is a uniform product. Sexual repro-
duction, however, requires two parents that will not possess the same
genetic composition and whose offspring may exhibit traits of either
parent. Plant breeding with sexually reproducing plants is a capricious
endeavor whose results are often difficult to explain. Hence, the PVPA's
uniformity requirement exists as a quality control mechanism to ensure
that farmers receive a somewhat predictable and stable seed crop.
(b) Farmers' Privilege
The PVPA was enacted with two unique exemptions, one for re-
searchers45 and another for farmers.' The research exemption is a nar-
row privilege that permits the use and reproduction of a protected variety
for bona fide research purposes. This is not perceived as a substantial
curtailment of the certificate holder's rights, because the monetary returns
from sales to research facilities are insignificant. The farmers' privilege,
on the other hand, represents a major encroachment upon inventors' rights
because farmers represent the principal purchasers of new plant varieties.
Section 2543 of title 7 defines the scope of farmers' privilege for
two general classes of agriculturists. The first class applies to all farmers,
permitting them (1) to sell crops produced from a protected variety for
other than reproductive purposes and (2) to save seed from their protected
crops for future use or for planting on the farm.47 Although the rights of
4' 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1988).
4 Id. at § 2543.
47 [I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by him
from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the
variety for seedling purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for
use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section. . . . It shall not infringe any
right hereunder for a person, whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops
for sale for other than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other persons
so engaged, for reproductive purposes . . ..
[V/ol. 27:083
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farmers to market their crops is a logical and necessary privilege, the
economic impact of the right to save seed is substantial. The developer
of a new plant species can exact only a one-time license fee from a farm-
er for the farmer's use of seed in perpetuity. This presents difficult, yet
not insurmountable, marketing and pricing considerations.
The second class applies only to those farmers "whose primary
occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive
purposes," and permits the sale of saved seed for reproductive purposes
to others engaged in farming as their primary occupation.4" This exemp-
tion provides for a wide distribution of certified seed without plant
breeders receiving compensation for their "protected" products. In just one
crop cycle developers of new plant varieties have essentially lost all
exclusive rights to market and sell their innovation.
These broad exemptions create substantial disincentives to investment
in developing new plant varieties; consequently, one wonders if the PVPA
is an appropriate place to legislate farm support programs. Additionally,
neither the PPA nor the PVPA recognizes any rights for protecting
advancements in the art of animal breeding. The net result is an odd
collection of laws that, in the aggregate, fail to provide sufficiently
extensive rights for those engaged in the agricultural sciences.
5. Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Patenting Living Matter
Prior to 1980, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the
lower federal courts engaged in a seemingly determined effort to reject
the patentability of living matter. Despite anomalous patents, such as that
issued to Louis Pasteur in 1873 for his purified culture of yeast,49 the
courts invariably rejected patents that pertained to living matter. Their
most effective weapon was the products of nature doctrine, as discussed
in the American Fruit Growers case." When that doctrine failed, the
PTO and private plaintiffs relied upon the plant protection acts of 1930
and 1970 as evidence that Congress intended that only living organisms
qualifying under one of the acts were to be afforded intellectual property
rights.5 ' Hence, plant and animal breeders and biotechnologists faced a
Id. "Future use" would encompass use as livestock feed, replanting and most other
dispositions of the seed that do not involve the sale for reproductive purposes.
48 Id.
49 Robert B. Kambic, Hindering the Progress of Science: The Use of the Patent
System to Regulate Research on Genetically Altered Animals, 16 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
441, 449 (1988).
s See supra notes 26-29.
s' In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The companion case to
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legal environment hostile to developments in their respective sciences.
In 1980, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in what is unequivo-
cally heralded as the landmark case in biotechnology-related patent law.52
The action was originated by a microbiologist challenging a ruling by the
PTO that denied his application to patent a genetically engineered strain
of bacteria capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil.
Chakrabarty's invention was a process for introducing specific plasmids,
each capable of breaking down one of the four components of the oil
molecule, into a host Pseudomonas bacteria.53 The unaltered, naturally
occurring Pseudomonas had no capacity for degrading oil; however, the
modified Pseudomonas had substantial value for treating oil spills.'
PTO examiners denied Chakrabarty's application on the duel analysis
that microorganisms are nonpatentable products of nature and that as
living things they are per se nonpatentable subject matter. The products
of nature argument was subsequently rejected by the Patent Office Board
of Appeals (Board) after they recognized that Pseudomonas possessing the
special characteristics of Chakrabarty's bacterium are not naturally occur-
ring.55 The Board, however, affirmed the PTO ruling on the second
argument, explaining that Congress's special provisions under the PPA
was conclusive evidence that § 101 was not intended to cover living
things. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of "whether
respondent's [Chakrabarty's] micro-organism constitutes a 'manufacture'
or 'composition of matter' within the meaning of [35 U.S.C. § 1o1i.56
Step one of the Court's analysis required defining the concepts
"manufacture" and "compositions of matter." The term "manufacture" was
given its dictionary definition to mean "the production of articles for use
from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms,
qualities, properties, or combination, whether by hand-labor or machin-
ery. '57 A composition of matter was cited in prior case law as including
Chakrabarty, In re Bergy, held that a biologically pure culture of microorganisms was
patentable subject matter. The PTO argument, urging that the PPA and the PVPA
evidenced a Congressional intent to remove plant life from coverage under the patent
laws, was rejected by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Id.
52 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
5 A plasmid is any inclusion in a cell that has a genetic function but is not
located in the nucleus. See 16 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICrIONARY 1415
(1989).
5 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
5 Id. at 306 n.3. See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 971 (rejecting the PTO's
argument regarding the products of nature doctrine).
16 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 306, 308.
' Id. at 308. Oddly enough, this definition was quoted from the American Fruit
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"all compositions of two or more substances and... all composite
articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical
mixture, or whether they be gasses, fluids, powders or solids."58
Step two involved reading these terms in their statutory context. The
Court proclaimed that the combination of such expansive terms as "manu-
facture" and "composition of matter" modified by the all-inclusive "any"
was indicative of Congress's intention that the patent laws be broadly
read. The Court also referred to committee reports from the 1952 recodi-
fication of the patent laws, which announced that it is Congress' intent
that the statutory subject matter include "anything under the sun that is
made by man."59 In conclusion, the Court held that the language of §
101 fairly embraced Chakrabarty's invention of the Pseudomonas organ-
ism, thus dispelling the notion that living matter is not patentable.
With this decision the Supreme Court unveiled to U.S. science and
industry a vast new world of opportunity. Initially, many waited to see if
Congress would accept the Supreme Court's invitation to enact regulations
covering the area of life patents.' ° However, as the resulting legislative
paralysis became apparent, a rush into genetic research ensued.
Chakrabarty's broad interpretation of patentable subject matter provided
U.S. companies with the promise of patents to protect their investments
into new technologies. As a result, U.S. industry greatly expanded its
commitment to genetic engineering, establishing an early position of
world dominance it has yet to yield.
6. The Legacy of Diamond v. Chakrabarty
Despite the sweeping construction of the Chakrabarty opinion - that
patentable subject matter should include "anything under the sun that is
made by man" - many questions remained. In a limited reading, the
Supreme Court had expressly authorized only the grant of a patent for a
Growers case, discussed previously. Certainly, the impregnation of the orange rind with
borax seems to have given the fruit a "new quality or property" because of Brogdex's
inventive labor.
S" Id See also Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp 279, 280 (D.C.
1957).
"' In 1952 Congress recodified the patent laws, the original language of which was
written by Jefferson. The recodification appears in 35 U.S.C. beginning with § 101 as
the present U.S. patent law.
See also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
5 (1952); H. R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).
' "Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection
organisms produced by genetic engineering. . . . Or it may choose to craft a statute
specifically designed for such living things." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318.
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microorganism that was not contemplated by either of the plant protection
acts. The question remained regarding whether the PTO and the courts
would sanction patent protections encompassing complex living organisms
such as plant and animal life, as Chakrabarty had decreed.
The first test occurred in 1985 in the case of Ex parte Hibberd,
heard before the PTO's Board.6' Hibberd concerned the patentability of
a corn plant engineered to possess an abnormally high level of amino
acids.6' The PTO had rejected Hibberd's application on the basis that the
existence of the PVPA meant that plants do not qualify for the standard
utility patent under 35 USC § 101. The Board rejected this argument,
recognizing "that neither the PPA nor the PVPA expressly excludes any
biological subject matter from protection under Section 101 [utility
patent]." The Board further recognized the inconsistency of allowing
utility patent protections for certain hybrid seeds, hybrid plants and
bacterium (Chakrabarty) that are expressly excluded from coverage under
the PPA or PVPA, but that are no less members of the plant kingdom.'
The 1987 case of Ex parte Allen, represented the next step for
Chakrabarty and the patentability of higher life forms. Allen challenged
the PTO examiners' denial of a patent application covering both a process
for inducing polyploiding in Pacific oysters and the end product oyster.
The examiner rejected Allen's application on the duel grounds of unpat-
entable naturally occurring subject matter and obviousness.'
The Board ultimately upheld the PTO examiner's refusal to grant a
patent on the grounds that "prior art" (previous discoveries) disclosed the
methods of polyploiding other species of oysters, - thus Allen's was an
obvious oyster.6' Yet, despite this basis for disposing of Allen's appeal,
the Board went out of its way to affirm Chakrabarty and reject the PTO
examiner's reliance on the antiquated products of nature doctrine. "The
61 Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (P.T.O. Bd. App. & Int. 1985).
' Amino acids are principal components of protein and, consequentially, an essential
element of the human diet. See 16 TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 64-75
(1989). Therefore, the presence of higher amino acid levels in corn creates an inexpen-
sive and accessible source of the necessary building materials of the human body. 1
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY 92 (1986).
Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444 n.1, 445.
Polyploiding of oysters entailed the maintenance of specific temperatures during
fertilization and incubation in addition to the application of predetermined levels of
hydrostatic pressure on the fertilized eggs. The result is an oyster that possesses an
additional set of chromosomes, rendering it sterile and capable of growing much larger
with a much higher meat content because of the absence of reproductive activity. Ex
parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (P.T.O. Bd. App. & Int. 1987).
' Id. at 1427.
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examiner has presented no evidence that the claimed polyploid oysters
occur naturally without the intervention of man" and as "non-naturally
occurring manufactures or compositions of matter are within the confines
of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101."'
Only days after the Board delivered the decision in Allen, the PTO
issued its renowned capitulatory Notice of April 7, 1987. The Notice
unequivocally stated that the examiner's office intended to live by the
terms of Chakrabarty and properly issue patents for "anything under the
sun that is made by man." The notice stated in part:
The Board relied upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty... as controlling authority that Congress intended statuto-
ry subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man." The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally
occurring non-human multi-cellular living organisms, including animals,
to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101....
Accordingly, the Patent and Trademark Office is now examining claims
directed to multi-cellular living organisms, including animals. To the
extent that the claimed subject matter is directed to non-human "non-
naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter - as product
of human ingenuity," (Diamond v. Chakrabarty), such claims will not be
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject
matter.'
This controversial statement withstood subsequent challenges in the courts
and in Congress, and paved the way for the first patent covering a multi-
cellular living mammal, the Harvard Mouse, patent issued April 12,
1988.69
6Id.
67 1077 OFFCIAL GAz. PAT. OFFICE 24, 31 (April 21, 1987).
3id.
' The case of Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir.
1991) considered a challenge to the PTO's authority to issue its Notice of April 7,
1987, on the dual grounds that (1) the PTO had violated procedural requirements for
issuing the notice without providing public notice and an opportunity for public
comment, and (2) that patenting animals threatened the breach of a variety of animal
protection laws. 1d. at 923-924. The Appellate Court dismissed it on the ground that
the Animal Legal Defense Fund lacked standing to sue because it had suffered no
legally cognizable injury. Id. at 925. Despite these grounds for dismissal, the court
could not resist commenting on Diamond and the scope of patentable subject matter:
"[tlhe issue, in our view, in determining whether the claimed subject matter is
patentable under Section 101 is simply whether that subject matter is made by man."
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7. Usurpation of the Plant Protection Acts
The Chakrabarty decision and its legacy substantially supplanted both
plant protection acts because of the flawed foundation upon which the
acts were constructed: that the scientific world could somehow be divided
into two classes (the micro-biological world of simple matter such as
bacteria and parasites, and a macro-biological world of complex living
organisms such as plants and animals). 0 This simplistic and antiquated
view of the biological world was shattered by the science of biotechnolo-
gy. Bioscientists have demonstrated that through exacting alterations at the
micro level of an organism's structure, one can obtain predictable macro
level changes. Hence, the biotech engineer has merged the two previously
postulated worlds, forcing the legal environment to confront and obstruct
science or to progress with it.
The pragmatic result of Chakrabarty is that now the inventor of a
new plant variety propagated by genetic engineering can pursue legal
protections through the PPA, the PVPA or a standard utility patent.
Qualification for a standard utility patent remains conditioned upon
satisfaction of the stringent disclosure requirements, precluding all but
genetically engineered plants and animals." However, for qualified
subject matter the benefits of a utility patent far exceed those provided by
either the PPA or the PVPA and are free from the numerous and burden-
Id. at 928 (citing Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426 (1987)).
Following the judicial activity addressing life patents in 1987, Congress responded
with a flurry of bills. The proposed legislation ranged from efforts to impose a
moratorium on the patenting of living matter, [H.R. 3119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987)] to more narrowly tailored bills that proposed the creation of farmers' privilege
applicable to patented transgenic plants and farm animals [The Transgenic Patent
Reform Act of 1988, H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988) and The Transgenic
Patent Reform Act of 1989, H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)]. Although these
bills provoked a substantial amount of public interest and debate, none were adopted.
Consequently, the biotechnology industry continued in its pursuit of new technologies
unimpeded by Congressionally imposed limitations upon the patentablity of their
products.
70 See LESLIE WILLIAM MELVILLE, 2 FORMS AND AGREEMENTS ON INTELLEcrAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LICENSING § 13.03[6] (1994).
"' The process of genetic engineering entails isolating the DNA molecule that
represents a desired characteristic and replacing that molecule with new DNA material
that contains the living code for reproducing said characteristic. This is an exact
science, subject to precise descriptions of replication. Conversely, the art of plant
breeding involves the blending of two plants and is not subject to the type of exacting
specifications required for a utility patent. 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY MEDICINE
AND BIOLOGY 1189 (1986).
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some exceptions found in the PVPA. Therefore, prudent inventors should
pursue legal protection via a utility patent whenever they qualify.72
Inextricably bound with the demise of the PVPA as the legal mecha-
nism of choice for protecting botanical inventions is the fate of farmers'
privilege. The PVPA is the exclusive domain of farmers' privilege
because neither the standard utility patent nor the PPA provides an
exemption for agriculture. As the utility patent becomes the method of
choice for protecting new bio-engineered plant varieties, the question
becomes whether farmers' privilege should be incorporated into the
standard utility patent. A secondary question is also raised: whether
farmers' privilege contained within the body of patent law should expand
to encompass an exemption for genetically engineered livestock.
C. Analysis of Farmers' Privilege
Ideally, the desirability of any legislation is determined by weighing
the cost of furnishing the legislation against the benefits to be derived
from it. We use this approach to examine farmers' privilege and begin by
analyzing the policy objectives that support including an agricultural
exemption within the patent laws. Next, we address the societal costs of
providing farmers' privilege, focusing on who bears the burden of paying
for the exemption and the consequences for the biotechnology industry.
Lastly, we begin to expand discussion of farmers' privilege to encompass
the international perspective, contrasting policy objectives of the U.S. with
those of the world community.
1. Policy Objectives
The argument in support of farmers' privilege focuses largely upon
the plight of small, family-owned farms. Advocates of farmers' privilege
realize that the contributions of biotechnology will enable agriculture to
make enormous leaps in productivity. However, they also realize that the
high development costs of bioengineered plants and animals will largely
preclude small farmers from participating in the new technologies. Only
large corporate agriculture, capable of spreading the costs among vast
economies of scale, will be able to afford the technologies.73 Productivity
gains realized from the combination of biotechnology and corporate
agriculture will, without intervention, jeopardize the cherished institution
of small, family-owned farms.
Although the focus of farmers' privilege debates seems inexorably
7 Sease, supra note 3, at 567.
Kambic, supra note 49, at 461. See also Gore, supra note 3, at 969.
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drawn into a discussion of the small, family-owned farm, one must
recognize that many classes benefit from farmers' privilege. The exemp-
tion within the PVPA grants farmers the right to save seed produced from
a protected variety (second generation seed) for future planting and in
certain instances for resale to other farmers.74 The crop exemption lowers
the cost of new and improved plant varieties to farmers who can acquire
second generation seed from other farmers at a fraction of the original
price. Providing lower cost access to improved seed and livestock will
certainly help the small farmer remain competitive with corporate agricul-
ture. However, the lower production costs realized by all farmers will
ultimately pass to consumers in the form of lower food prices."5
This examination exposes important considerations regarding an
exemption for agriculture. Although the primary intention of farmers'
privilege is to protect the institution of the small, family-owned farm, the
principal beneficiary is the consumer who profits from lower prices and
a stabilized food supply.76 Yet, the burden of paying for it is borne by
inventors who are denied the exclusive right to sell their technologies and
thereby obtain a fair return on investment. This generates controversy
regarding whether intellectual property laws are the appropriate forum
from which to legislate agricultural support programs and prompts investi-
gation into the consequences of forcing the financial burden upon the
biotechnological industry.
2. Societal Costs
In pursuit of the goal of making agriculturally related technologies
available to small, family-owned farms, one must remember the fun-
damental rationales for granting intellectual property rights. The purpose
7 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1988). See also Plant Variety Protection Act, supra note 28,
§ 113.
' Agricultural product markets are close to perfectly competitive markets. A
perfectly competitive market is defined by four characteristics: (1) numerous participants,
(2) homogeneity of product, (3) freedom of entry and exit and (4) perfect pricing
information. Under these conditions the individual firms (farmers) are price takers,
having no choice but to accept the price that has been determined in the market.
Consequently, if simultaneous productivity increases and reductions in production costs
are realized, the supply of agricultural output would be expected to increase. If supply
goes up, market prices will fall and consumers will reap the benefits of lower food
prices. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS; PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
468-482 (3d ed. 1985).
716 Through the use of more durable and more plentiful varieties, more food can be
cultivated on less land. Economic fundamentals teach that if the supply of food in-
creases, certerus paribus, the price must decrease. Id. at 482.
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of the patent system is to promote the progress of science by securing for
inventors the exclusive rights to their discoveries for a limited time.
Through the grant of property rights to inventions, inventors are able to
profit from their ingenuity, which, in turn, fosters the advancement of
science and technology.' It would therefore follow that curtailment of
inventors' property rights, which impedes their ability to profit, would
diminish their incentive to invent.
The concern of adequate return on investment is particularly acute
among biotechnology companies that invest enormous amounts of time
and money to bring a genetically engineered product to market. Calgene
Fresh, Inc., a California-based biotech concern, has invested ten years and
$20 million into engineering a genetically superior tomato, the Flavr Savr
MacGregor tomato. The Flavr Savr has a ninety percent longer vine-and-
shelf life than the ordinary tomato, the result of Calgene's reversing the
gene that causes spoilage. The Flavr Savr is among the first successes of
the ag-biotech industry and provides tangible evidence of the forthcoming
benefits of genetically engineered foods." Unfortunately, private industry
will not continue to fund these projects if intellectual property rights are
eroded by exemptions such as farmers' privilege, thus full commercial
exploitation of new ideas will be inhibited.
Tampering with patent laws to achieve public policy should be used
only as a last resort. Options, such as government intervention through
regulation or as a market player, should be exhausted before beginning to
abridge inventors' rights. Indeed, governments are capable of achieving
the objectives of farmers' privilege through alternative methods of inter-
vention, which accomplish a more logical and practical solution. Funda-
mental economics teach that when society as a whole benefits from
regulatory intervention, government, which represents the whole, should
bear the burden of providing those benefits or market distortions will
occur.!9 Transferring the burden to a select segment of private industry,
like ag-biotech and plant breeders, undermines the incentive for those
parties to invest in the new ideas from which we all benefit.
The existence of farmers' privilege shows that the U.S. government
wants to assist farmers by making new technologies accessible, particular-
ly to the small, family farmer who could otherwise not afford it. 0 To
achieve this goal wealthy governments possess regulatory options that do
not distort the economic incentives of investing in new technologies."1
See U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Keane, supra note 10, at 139.
71 Sandier, supra note 2, at 12.
79 BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 75, at 550-551.
'o Kambic, supra note 49, at 461.
" See generally id. (discussing the U.S. patent system's encouragement of innova-
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Examples of such legislation include enabling farmers to purchase new
technology through subsidized government loans, providing financial
incentives such as tax breaks for patent owners who sell below market
price, or direct government purchases. These forms of intervention could
also be tailored to promote only small farmers, if that is the principal
concern of government. Thus, farmers' privilege using patent or plant
variety protected subject matter is neither a necessary nor a desirable
exemption for developed nations when less distortive alternatives exist.
3. Alternative Legislation
Agriculture in developing countries is often largely performed on a
subsistence basis in which the farmers' exclusive function is to supply
food for personal or local consumption. Land is typically parceled out
into small and underproductive plots, which precludes those countries
from realizing the economies of scale that corporate farms in developed
countries are capable of achieving. Consequently, farmers cannot afford
the expensive seeds, feeds, fertilizers and pesticides that increase produc-
tivity. The absence of such agricultural catalysts inhibits the ability of
underdeveloped countries to feed their populations and to provide their
people with an opportunity to earn a living producing raw materials.
For countries that lack the public financing necessary to provide
alternative means of agricultural support, farmers' privilege is a popular
concept. Consequently, the leaders and proponents of underdeveloped
countries promote a multinational treaty that would create an internation-
ally recognized farmers' privilege. The efforts to achieve such an interna-
tional convention have thus far been unsuccessful because of strong
opposition from countries that believe their economic future is in develop-
ing biotechnological sciences.
Although the debate appears to be a return to the age-old conflict of
the haves attempting to protect their property, intellectual or otherwise,
from the have-nots, there is a much more significant question to consider.
The issue is whether international farmers' privilege would discourage
investment in new agricultural technologies by undermining the ability to
profit from one's innovation. In essence, this is an analysis of the "[flight
to save seed/crop exemption" contained within the PVPA but on an
international scale.
If the world fails to fully compensate inventors of new and improved
plant varieties, then the optimal level of investment in developing im-
proved seed, feed and livestock will not be achieved. This concern must
be carefully addressed within any multinational convention that purports
tion through invention protection).
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to create farmers' exemption. The second half of this Article examines
international efforts, discusses their workability and proposes alternative
solutions to the dilemma of farmers' privilege.
M. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS ADDRESSING
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS AND FARMERS' PRIVILEGE
The international markets for goods and services have become
increasingly important, focusing much attention upon constructing a
unified standard of international commercial laws. The need for a unify-
ing convention is particularly acute in the area of patent law: presently
179 international jurisdictions grant patents, each with its procedures and
substantive peculiarities. Obtaining multinational patent rights in this
chaotic environment can be expensive and time consuming, if not impos-
sible. The primary obstacle for the inventor is the thousands of dollars
required per jurisdiction in filing costs and attorney fees, even though the
inventor may receive patents in only a fraction of these jurisdictions. 2
The proposition that a uniform system for recognizing international
patent rights would reduce a great deal of the waste and inefficiency is
unchallenged, but an impassioned debate has arisen regarding the scope
of protections which could be achieved by a supranational convention.
Private industry in developed countries prefers the most expansive bundle
of property rights possible to protect its new technologies. Developing
countries are demanding that private industry in developed countries
surrender certain rights in consideration for the benefits to be realized
under a universal patent system. Among the developing nations' concerns
is the exclusion of living organisms from the scope of protectable subject
matter. This demand is not wholly unreasonable, considering that a
significant percentage of genetic material used in bioengineering new
plants and animals is native to their countries.
Despite numerous attempts within several international fora, devel-
oped and developing countries have thus far failed to reach a compro-
mise. The remainder of this Article discusses the international conventions
that have attempted to establish a globally recognized patent and analyzes
why each ultimately failed or appears doomed to fail..
A. World Intellectual Property Organization
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)"3 was founded
The 179 jurisdictions include 176 countries and 3 supranational bodies. See
Edward J. Raldo, Recent Developments Affect International Patent Harmony, L.A.
DAILY J., Aug. 25, 1993, at 7.
" Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation, July 7,
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on July 14, 1967, as a specialized agency of the U.N. WIPO was con-
ceived as an administrative body to oversee the Paris Union on the
Protection of Industrial Property and to provide a forum for future
revisions in order to harmonize international intellectual property lawsY
The basic rights and obligations under the Paris Union are threefold: (1)
national treatment - each member agrees to provide foreign applicants the
same access to intellectual property rights as domestic applicants receive,
(2) right of foreign priority - each member agrees to recognize for
priority purposes the original date of a foreign application and (3) unfair
competition - each member must enact basic legislation pertaining to
unfair competition in international trade.'
The provisions of the Paris Union benefit foreign inventors by
ensuring equal access to the intellectual property laws of member nations
and by securing an internationally recognized priority date from the first
patent application regardless of where the application is filed. However,
inventors are still exposed to the administrative burden and expense of
individually pursuing property rights in each country in which they desire
protections. Furthermore, the Paris Union is not a harmonization treaty. It
obligates member nations only to recognize reciprocal rights for foreign
inventors, thereby permitting each jurisdiction to maintain its idiosyncratic
laws which are replete with substantive and procedural peculiarities.
Consequently, not only is obtaining property rights an uncertainty for
inventors, but also enforcing those rights in 179 independent jurisdictions
is a logistical impracticability.
WIPO was quick to recognize the gross inadequacies of the 1967
version of the Paris Union, and it resolved to seek a revision creating a
unitary system of minimal patent protections that would be established
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
' The Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property was established in 1883
to end the practice of discrimination against foreign patent applications. WIPO is also
delegated similar authority with respect to the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Copyrights. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
U.S.T.S. 379. See also COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 84, § 15.1 (Nov. 26, 1992) [hereinafter COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMEN-
TARIES].
5 ROSENBERG, supra note 34, § 18.05. Point one is in essence an agreement not
to discriminate against foreign applicants. It does not require that a country recognize
rights in certain intellectual property, but if the nation does recognize certain rights it
must make them available to foreign applicants equally.
Point two prevents a person from obtaining property rights when that person copies
an application in country A and is the first to file the same patent in country B.
Country B is obligated to recognize the priority date of the original inventor's applica-
tion in country A.
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when one universal application was filed and approved. In 1970 WIPO
convened its first diplomatic conference to begin that work. WIPO has
convened three additional diplomatic conferences, in which very little was
accomplished.86 WIPO is currently circulating a new proposal in prepara-
tion for a fifth diplomatic conference.' Speculation is that WIPO's latest
efforts will meet with little more success than the previous attempts.
In theory, the developed nations of North America, Europe and Asia
should emphatically endorse WIPO's efforts. Yet, they do not. The reason
is attributable to the organization's foundations. As a subsidiary organiza-
tion of the U.N., WIPO embodies a strong proclivity toward the plight of
developing nations, who comprise a majority of U.N. membership.8
Therefore, private industry in developed nations is inherently suspect of
WIPO's efforts. Industry would rather have these issues addressed in a
more favorable forum - like the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATI) - over which it wields much stronger influence.89
The principal discord is WIPO's attempt to include provisions that
would require technology transfers to developing nations, authorize
compulsory licensing of protected technology, and other substantive
limitations upon the rights of patent holders, which benefit developing
nations at the expense of private industry.' WIPO continually refuses to
include new plant varieties within the scope of patentable subject matter,
choosing instead to force plant-related protections within the unsavory
competence of the International Union for the Protection of New Plant
Varieties (UPOV).9  These policies substantially undermine adequate in-
tellectual property protection for biotechnology advancements. In essence,
WIPO amounts to an expansive farmers' privilege, which allows the use
of technology while it excuses the obligation to compensate the develop-
er, thereby denying biotechnology companies the opportunity to obtain a
fair return for their investments in new technologies.
One should not expect that WIPO will be the forum within which a
patent harmonization treaty is achieved in the near future. Its allegiances
are too transparent, such that developed nations are reluctant to make it
the forum of choice. These beliefs are echoed by the organization's
director general, who recently stated, "[a]t present, WIPO does not intend
COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES, supra note 84, § 15.1.
Alex Barnum, Proposed Treaty on Patents Under Fire, SAN FRAN. CHRoN., Dec.
20, 1993, at B1.
8 Cf COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARiES, supra note 84, § 14.3.
Kevin Watkins, Battle for the Rights to Life, THE GuARDIAN, Feb. 7, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, GUARDN File. See Section D infra.
0 CooPER & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES, supra note 84, § 15.1.
See Section B infra.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
to provoke changes in national legislation; it only wants to make govern-
ments more aware [of developments and the problems to be solved]." 2
Hence, WIPO has for the present assumed a role as consultant to achiev-
ing an international patent harmonization treaty while passing its baton to
those promoting the Convention on Biological Diversity. 3
B. Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties
The UPOV9 was conceived along the lines of the Paris Union as
an international convention for the purpose of coordinating protections for
plant breeders that would transcend national boundaries. Similar to WIPO,
UPOV requires signatory countries to provide (1) national treatment - af-
fording foreign applicants of member nations the same plant breeders'
rights available to domestic breeders, although no minimum level of
protections is required to qualify for membership, (2) right of foreign
priority - recognizing the filing date of first application within a member
nation for priority purposes and (3) independent jurisdiction - granting
rights in a country only when an applicant files with that nation's inde-
pendent examiner's office.95 Consequently, the same obstacles of cost
and substantive incongruities burden UPOV applicants.
At present UPOV consists of twenty-one nations, all classified as
developed or rapidly developing nations.96 That few developing nations
belong is predictable. Most developing nations lack legislation protecting
plant breeders' rights, and enactment of such laws is not politically
feasible for two reasons: (1) how could the government of a poor, agri-
culturally based economy enforce laws that would deprive its farmers of
needed technologies for cultivating their subsistence crops?' and (2)
what forms of punishment or deterrence could be exercised against such
infringers?
UPOV's first drawback is that limited participation undermines its
9 Whaite & Jones, supra note 14, at 146, 147 nn. 32-33.
9 See Section C infra.
4 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties, supra note 40.
9- ROSENBERG, 3 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS supra note 34, § 18.05, 18-13.
6 The membership of the UPOV includes all members of the European Economic
Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the U.K.) as well as several non-EC
nations (Hungary, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland and
the U.S.). See Will Patents Keep Up with Developments in Plant Science?, BIOTECH-
NOLOGY BUSINESS NEWS, May 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BIOBUS
File [hereinafter Will Patents Keep Up].
9 Cf. John H. Barton, Patenting Life, SCi. AM., Mar. 1991, at 40, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File. See also Will Patents Keep Up, supra note 96.
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effectiveness for protecting large investments into plant-related biotechnol-
ogies. Second is its authorization that a member nation may provide
farmers' privilege within its domestic laws and may subject foreign
applicants to the farmer's privilege exemption.98 Accordingly, a develop-
ing nation could become a signatory and simply provide expansive
privileges for its domestic farmers to make use of protected plant variet-
ies. Despite this capability, UPOV contains no mechanism for compulsory
sharing of plant breeding technologies, and nothing prohibits private
enterprise in a member nation from refusing to do business with another
member nation if the lack of substantive protections discourages such
commerce.
A third drawback are the 1991 amendments to the convention, which
its membership is ratifying and adopting. The amendments divide plant
breeders' rights and patent rights and permit member nations to withhold
reciprocal recognition of plant breeders' rights for biological organisms
that have been patented in another country.99 To illustrate this provision,
we revisit the case of American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex. Assuming that
Brogdex had been awarded a U.S. patent for its borax-impregnated
oranges, under the UPOV's 1991 amendments, the other member nations
could reject a subsequent application seeking reciprocal national plant
breeders' rights.
Biotech concerns in the U.S. will invariably choose the more com-
prehensive protections available under domestic patent laws for reasons
discussed in Section One. Therefore, the ability of UPOV members to
deny plant variety protections for patented biological material renders this
convention potentially meaningless for the biotechnology industry.
Finally, regarding the needs of the biotechnology industry, UPOV is
materially incomplete. This deficiency is inherent within UPOV's narrow
scope - to provide intellectual property protection for new botanic plant
varieties. UPOV does not address the need for protections for microorgan-
isms and complex nonbotanical living matter, thereby ignoring the majori-
ty of biotechnological applications such as biochemicals, pharmaceuticals,
biorational pesticides, bioremedial environmental cleanup organisms and
genetically engineered animals. Because UPOV offers only limited
protections for those engaged in plant breeding, it is a declining influence
among international intellectual property harmonization efforts.
9 Will Patents Keep Up, supra note 96.
9 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of March
1991, opened for signature Mar. 19, 1991.
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C. The Convention on Biological Diversity
In the summer of 1992 the international community focused its
attention upon Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the site of the multinational confer-
ence on biodiversity. Its objective was the adoption of the biodiversity
treaty, which promoted (1) the conservation of biological diversity, (2) the
sustainable use of biological components and (3) the fair and equitable
sharing of benefits arising out of genetic resources."r Despite President
Bush's refusal to adopt the treaty, it achieved a qualified success: 162
nations signed. Since then the treaty was ratified by the requisite number
of nations and entered into force on December 29, 1993. °
The reason the U.S. did not sign the treaty is largely attributable to
the ambiguous concept of the "equitable share." This concept was born
out of the concern that biotechnological and pharmaceutical corporations
from developed nations are using the flora and fauna native to, and
subject to the sovereign rights of, underdeveloped nations to engineer
their discoveries.' The resultant products are then protected and sold
" United Nations Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, art. I,
reprinted in 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 372 (June 3, 1992) [hereinafter
Draft Convention on Biological Diversity].
"01 United States: Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programme
Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological
Diversity. May 22, 1992.
3. It is deeply regrettable to us that - whether because of the haste with which we
have completed our work or the result of substantive disagreement - a number of
issues of serious concern in the United States have not been adequately addressed in the
course of this negotiation. As a result, in our view, the text is seriously flawed in a
number of important respects.
4. As a matter of substance, we find particularly unsatisfactory the text's treatment of
intellectual property rights; finances; including, importantly, the role of the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF); technology transfer and biotechnology.
Id. See also Stalling on Biodiversity, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 22, 1993, at A4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSDTL File.
The terms of the treaty provided that the document would enter into effect ninety
days after it had been ratified by thirty nations. On October 1, 1993, Mongolia became
the thirtieth nation to ratify, enabling the treaty to enter into effect on December 29,
1993. To date more than forty nations have ratified the treaty, including: Bahamas, Bar-
bados, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Canada, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Mongolia,
Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Sweden, Uganda and Uruguay. See
Rio Treaty Has 29 Ratifications, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) (Sept. 28, 1993); Hotline,
ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Nov. 1993, at 16; Treaty Enters Into Force 18 Months
After Its Signing At 1992 Earth Summit, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) No. 248, at D-5
(Dec. 30, 1993).
" Stalling on Biodiversity, supra note 101. See also Draft Convention on Biological
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in the global marketplace at a substantial profit. Hence, foreign companies
exploit and profit from the resources of developing nations, which lack
both the infrastructure for capitalizing on those resources and the econom-
ic wherewithal to purchase the benefits derived from the new technologies
whose raw materials originated in their countries. 3
Article 16 of the Treaty, entitled "Access to and Transfer of Tech-
nology," states, "[e]ach contracting party shall ... provide access to and
transfer of technology [to fellow contracting parties] ... including
technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights."''
The vague terminology within this article is subject to an interpretation
that would require private industry in developed nations to surrender its
protected technologies without assurances of compensation. As Richard
Godown, president of the Industrial Biotechnology Association, comment-
ed, "[ilt would call upon us to give away our inventions by not providing
for adequate protections."' 5
The Association of Biotechnology Companies, a U.S. organization
that promotes the interests of biotech concerns, believed that the treaty
would be substantially detrimental to those in ag-biotech.' ° The treaty
expressly provides that engineers of new agricultural-related technologies
must provide "access to and transfer of technologies ... that make use
of genetic resources ... to developing countries."" This broad lan-
guage is susceptible to an interpretation that a super-farmers' privilege has
been created - not only a right to use but a power to compel the re-
linquishing of agriculturally related biotechnology patents.
The treaty furthermore provides that the technology innovator in a
developed nation must share "the benefits arising from the commercial
and other utilization of genetic resources with the ... [country] ...
providing such resources."' ' This provision clearly contemplates inven-
tors transfering their technologies to developing nations without compen-
sation. It also suggests that income earned from sales of the technology
be shared with the country that contributes the biological material. Again,
the treaty's ambiguous language creates the potential for sweeping for-
feiture of intellectual property rights.
Diversity, supra note 100, arts. 3, 16
"o See Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 100, at arts. 15, 16
para. 3.
4 Id. at art. 16.
10 Therese Poletti, Biotech, Drug Industry Defend Bush on Biodiversity, REUTERS
FINANCIAL WIRE, June 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUFIN File.
106 Id.
o Draft Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 100, at art. 16, paras. 1, 2.
I d. at art. 15, para. 7.
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Despite the treaty's ambiguous language and possible biotechnology-
related intellectual property rights problems, the Clinton Administration
genuinely believed in the treaty's aspirations. President Clinton said that
ensuring the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use
of biological resources "is critically important to the future of the
world."" 9 Furthermore, he perceives U.S. participation as a critical
component of the treaty's ultimate success. To procure that success, the
Clinton Administration drafted a letter of interpretation that clarified the
U.S. understanding of the agreement's vague provisions pertaining to the
protections of biotechnology.11° This letter will be submitted, along with
U.S. ratification, as an understanding of this nation's rights and obliga-
tions arising out of the treaty.
To ensure the support of the biotech industry, Clinton enlisted the
help of the State Department to assist in drafting the letter of interpreta-
tion. Known as Treaty Document 103-20, this letter emphasizes that a
company has the exclusive rights to the technology it owns."' It details
four principal areas of concern: (1) the treaty is not retroactive, (2)
transfer of technology must be voluntary and must take into account
companies' exclusive rights to the technologies they own, (3) there will
be no compulsory licensing and (4) biosafety protocol on the handling of
biotechnology products is not necessary.1
2
Regarding the controversial "equitable share" concept, the letter
stated,
The United States interprets this to mean that [fair and equitable shar-
ing] must take fully into account exclusive rights to technology that a
party may possess, and that transfers of proprietary technology will
occur only at the discretion of, and with the voluntary consent of, the
owner of the technology.
Regarding Article 16: "The United States interprets 'fair and most favor-
" Biodiversity Treaty to be Sent to the Senate Before Congressional Recess,
McGinty Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Treaty
to be Sent to Senate].
110 Id.
. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGIcAL DIVERSITY, WITH ANNEXES, DONE AT RIO DE JANIERO
JuNE 5, 1992, AND SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES IN NEW YORK, JUNE 4, 1993, S.
TREATY Doc. 20, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT].
t' Biotechnology Industry Endorses Administration Interpretation of Treaty, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A226 (Nov. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Biotechnology In-
dustry Endorses Administration Interpretation].
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able terms' to mean terms that are voluntarily agreed to by all parties to
the transaction .... In particular, the Convention does not provide a basis
for the use of compulsory licensing laws to compel private companies to
transfer technology.""'
The Administration signed the treaty on June 4, 1993, and submitted
it and the letter of interpretation to Capital Hill on November 20, 1993.
The Senate must advise and consent for U.S. ratification." 4 Clinton's
consensus building has achieved the coveted support of private industry.
Richard Godown stated, "[wie have been working with the Administra-
tion, and we are very, very pleased at the prospects."'
15
The international community, however, is not happy with the letter
of interpretation. International commentators accuse the U.S. of attempting
to unilaterally obtain the terms it was unable to procure in treaty negotia-
tions."6 To counter such opposition, the U.S. has sent its letter of in-
terpretation to industrialized nations in Europe and Asia, encouraging
them to file similar statements of interpretation with their ratifications." 7
But by unilaterally renegotiating the treaty's terms, the industrialized
nations appear to be imposing their desires over the will of developing
nations.
The treaty will not affect international biotechnology protections any
time soon. It is merely a framework that remains to be completed through
subsequent international negotiations. Considering the interpretive state-
ment filed by the U.S. and the perturbed reactions of developing nations,
the parties seem no closer to resolution than they were in the summer of
1992.
The apparent failure of the treaty, at least for the immediate future,
is perhaps the most favorable outcome for the biotechnology industry.
This Article has repeatedly touched upon the theme that compulsory
uncompensated sharing of technology, although reaping short-term benefits
for those afforded access, has negative long-term consequences. The
amount of resources invested into the development of new ideas is
directly correlated with the expected returns of achieving a breakthrough.
If industry perceives low economic returns for an investment in ag-
biotech because of an international convention, such as the biodiversity
treaty, then little money will be invested in that area. Therefore, despite
1' MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 111, at XI, XII, XIII.
" Id. at V.
"5 Biodiversity Treaty to be Sent to Senate, supra note 109. See also Biotechnology
Industry Endorses Administration Interpretation, supra note 112.
116 Biodiversity Treaty to be Sent to Senate, supra note 109.
"" Policy on Environment, Trade Nexus Expected From Administration in June,
[Jan.-June] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 756 (May 5, 1993).
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resentment against the U.S. and other industrialized nations for drafting
their letters of interpretation, U.S. rejection of compulsory licensing and
technology transfers is a fundamentally sound position.
D. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The GATT was conceived in 1947 as a provisional instrument to
resolve trade disputes pending adoption of the more complete Internation-
al Trade Organization (ITO). In 1948, when the U.S. rejected ITO, GATT
emerged as the principal vehicle for implementing liberalized international
trade policy. Since its inception, GATT has sponsored eight rounds of
multilateral negotiations relating to tariffs and other trade barriers. The
most recent series, the Uruguay Round, began in 1986 to address trade
issues pertaining to services, foreign investment, and intellectual property
rights - in addition to former topics."' It concluded on December 15,
1993, the last day of a U.S.-imposed deadline, but not before the agree-
ment was nearly derailed because of disagreements over the disposition of
biotechnology and other intellectual property rights."9
The portion of GATT that addresses intellectual property issues is
called the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). The principal proponent of the TRIPs initiative was the U.S.,
which loses an estimated $60 billion annually as a consequence of patent
violations alone by developing nations. 2 ' Japan, the EC and other de-
veloped nations joined with the U.S. in its push for a universally accepted
system of intellectual property protections.
In April 1990, TRIPs proponents presented the GATT commission
with a draft legal text for an international agreement on intellectualproperty protections." Without question the most controversial section
authorized patents for living organisms and biological processes, encom-
passing microorganisms, seeds, plants and animals.
1.8 Kenneth W. Abbott, Introduction and Bibliography in Regulation of International
Trade: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1 BASIC Doc. OF INT'L ECON.
LAW (1990), available in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, BDIEL File.
"9 A Guide to the GATT; What's at Stake in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1993, at A16. December 15, 1993, was the expiration date
of special "fast-track" legislation enacted by Congress, which enabled the Clinton
Administration to negotiate a GATT agreement that would not be subject to congressio-
nal line-by-line review. It was generally agreed that if GATr were not adopted prior
to the expiration date, it could not survive Congressional review. Id.
'2 Watkins, supra note 89.
1., COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES, supra note 84, § 14.1.
'" Watkins, supra note 89.
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Developing nations opposed covering patent issues within the GAIT
negotiations, which they perceived as subservient to the interests of
industrialized nations. They contended that a trade agreement was an
improper forum within which to incorporate intellectual property
rights.' Some environmental organizations have advocated that such
issues should be resolved within the competence of WIPO or the
biodiversity treaty, which have traditionally dealt with those issues and in
which developing nations are heard. 24
To obtain the developing nations' support, necessary to affirm the
TRIPs accord, supporters conceded to the removal from patentable subject
matter microorganisms, nonbiological processes for the production of
plants and animals and microbiological processes for the production of
plants and animals."z The result is that only living organisms and bio-
logical processes that are achieved by traditional breeding methods are
protectable - a stance consistent with UPOV. In the words of Pfizer
Pharmaceutical's president, TRIPs "excludes the critical class of biotech-
nological inventions with the greatest potential commercial gain."'"
GATT was an unqualified defeat for the biotechnology industry and
particularly for those engaged in agricultural genetic engineering. The
efficiencies of a universally recognized patent remain unavailable to
developers of biotechnological inventions. Instead, the industry must
continue to pursue patent protections in each of 179 jurisdictions in which
it desires to market its products. The betrayal felt within the biotechnolo-
gy industry led many to clandestinely hope that the Uruguay Round
would fail and cause the U.S. government to pursue unilateral actions.
These sentiments were confirmed by Mark Ritchie of the Agricultural
Policy Institute: "They [biotech companies] now believe their interests
will be better served by recourse to unilateral trade threats and sanctions
than by a multinational accord."'
27
E. Bilateral Trade Accords and Unilateral Trade Sanctions
Although the U.S. has failed to attain a universal convention for
' U.S. 'TRIPS' Plan Would Allow Monopoly of Genetic Resources, Greenpeace
Says, [1990] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1805-06 (Nov. 28, 1990).
124 COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES, supra note 84, § 14.1.
" Concern Over GATT Patent Proposals, BIOTECHNOLOGY Bus. NEws, Feb. 14,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BIOBUS File.
"Non-biological processes" are defined as those which neither occur in nature nor
correspond to classical breeding processes. Id.
'" Watkins, supra note 89.
12 J&
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harmonizing international laws protecting biotechnology, the government
and private industry have achieved success with bilateral trade agree-
ments. The U.S. is among the wealthiest nations in the international
community and is the nerve center of many of the world's richest multi-
national corporations. Developing nations covet both access to U.S.
markets and the ability to attract U.S. foreign investment as the keys to
unlocking their economic potential. These privileges equip the U.S. and
its private sector with powerful leveraging tools they have used to extract
favorable treatment for biotechnology. The following two examples
illustrate this point.
1. Merck - Costa Rica Accord
In 1991, Merck, the multinational pharmaceutical corporation, stunned
many around the world when it announced a landmark biodiversity accord
with Costa Rica. Merck agreed to pay $1 million to the Costa Rican
government in exchange for access to their biological material and
information about rainforest life forms. The biological materials are to be
collected and inspected under the direction of a Costa Rican government
agency, a comprehensive undertaking expected to employ many Costa Ri-
cans. 8 If Merck develops a commercially practical product derived
from Costa Rican materials or information, the Costa Rican government
will be entitled to royalty payments. 9
In essence, the Merck-Costa Rica accord is a mini-biodiversity treaty.
Costa Rica receives valuable compensation for providing biological
resources and information to Merck, thereby providing Costa Rica with
the incentive to preserve its biological diversity in the hopes of realizing
future royalties. Through the accord, Merck purchases access to Costa
Rica's natural resources without compromising its property rights in new
technologies derived from the rainforests.
2. The Brazilian Experience with Unilateral Trade Sanctions
Many governments understand that stronger protections for intellectu-
al property promotes international competitiveness by attracting capital
investment and facilitating the flow of technology. 3 For those govern-
" See Treaty Interferes With Principals of Patent Protection, U.S. Official Says,
Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) 406, (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter Treaty Interferes With
Principals of Patent Protection]. See also Rio Update: MNC's Help Shape Green Policy
Worldwide, CRoss BORDER MONITOR, June 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BUSINT File.
Treaty Interferes With Principals of Patent Protection, supra note 128.
"3 Brazilian Conference Examines IP Protection in South America, Int'l Bus. Daily
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ments that fail to reach this resolution, the U.S. has not hesitated to
intervene. At the disposal of the U.S. government are two popularly
propounded trade sanctions: Special 301 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act' 3' and § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.132
The effectiveness of Special 301 and § 337 are illustrated by the
recent conflict between the U.S. and Brazil arising over Brazil's lack of
adequate intellectual property protections. When Brazil's proposal for
intellectual property reform emerged from its House of Deputies in May
1993, only to be held up by the Brazilian Senate, U.S. trade represen-
tatives began preparing a list of retaliatory measures.
The first level of action proposed the removal of Brazil from our
Generalized System of Preferences, which grants duty-free entry of certain
goods from developing countries like Brazil. If this action were deemed
insufficient, the U.S. could begin imposing higher import duties on
selected Brazilian goods to spurn quicker action. When one considers that
the U.S. consumes twenty-two percent of all Brazilian exports, these
proposed trade sanctions could dramatically deepen Brazil's already severe
recession."M
Brazil's is not an uncommon experience among developing nations,
especially those within the sphere of U.S. influence. The enormous
economic strength of the U.S. provides it the leverage to influence change
in almost every nation. This type of coercive action is discouraged by
U.S. trading partners and the collective voice of GATT; consequently, it
is reserved for the worst offenders. Nevertheless, as the biotech industry
emerges as a strategic component of U.S. international trade, developing
nations should anticipate the aggressive use of Special 301 and § 337
unless a harmonizing convention is achieved that includes protection for
biotechnological innovations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The enormous amount of energy expended attempting to achieve
international patent law harmony pertaining to biotechnologies has thus
far generated few results. An impasse divides the interests of developed
and developing nations. Developed countries bring to the negotiating table
valuable technology from private industry, which they refuse to divulge
to developing nations without adequate protections. Developing nations,
(BNA) (Dec. 24, 1991).
131 See 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1993).
132 See id. at § 1337 (1993).
"3 Brazil's Patent Protection Bill Remains Stalled in Congress, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) at 1944 (Nov. 17, 1993).
13 Id.
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not without their bargaining chips, possess large potential markets for the
technology, the possibility of a universally recognized patent system and
the threat that absent a resolution of the issues they will continue to
pirate those technologies when possible. At stake is the evolution of the
biotechnology industry and the untold progress and prosperity it promises
to bestow upon the world.
The authors do not perceive negotiations as a zero-sum game; rather,
through compromise there is a synergy whose benefits can be shared by
all parties. With a unified system of international patent protections for
biotechnology, private industry will save countless resources that other-
wise would be wasted on filing and enforcing applications in 179 inde-
pendent jurisdictions. Similarly, by contributing reasonable licensing fees,
developing countries will gain from new technologies that will help them
feed their populations, cure disease and increase their general welfare.
This relationship will then generate new capital investment that will fuel
future advancements in biotechnology.
If the international community desires an equitable sharing of wealth
and technology with developing nations, it should not use the mechanism
of an intellectual property convention to achieve that goal. Forcing the
financial burden upon the biotech industry creates a disincentive to future
investment and consequently sacrifices the progress of technology.
To resolve this issue the authors propose a two part-solution. First,
to help developing nations share in the technology, industrialized nations
should contribute to a U.N. supervised fund, similar to the World Bank
or the International Monetary Fund, that would provide subsidized loans
and other direct assistance to nations with demonstrated need. Second, to
help developing nations share in the benefits derived from the natural re-
sources of those nations, the international community should facilitate
relationships like that between Costa Rica and Merck. These relationships
not only would compensate countries for preserving their natural resourc-
es, but also can be structured to provide transfers of technology. The
advantages of this solution are that it (1) benefits those who need assis-
tance, in contrast to sweeping exemptions that allow any nation a free
ride, (2) creates the opportunity for those who contribute valuable natural
resources to profit from their contributions and (3) shifts the burden of
providing financial assistance to governments, thereby removing the
disincentive created with a single industry.
This solution suggests only a broad approach to resolve the conflict
between private industry and developing nations. However, we view this
solution as a workable foundation upon which the international communi-
ty can begin constructing a new multinational convention dedicated to
assisting developing nations, preserving biological diversity and harmoniz-
ing biotechnology patent laws.
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